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EXHIBITS LIST 
No hearing was held, and no exhibits were offered or admitted. The decision was based upon a 
stipulation of facts. 
EXHIBITS LIST - i 
SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUST , COMMISSION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. , 83720, BOISE, IDAHO 83720-0041 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
COMPLAINT I.C. No.13-024694 
CLAIMANT'S (INJURED WORKER) NAME AND ADDRESS 
BARBARA KELLY 
1224 Street Sp I 
Clarkston, "' 99403 
TELEPHONE NUMBER: (208) 816-9582 
EMPLOYER'S NAtviE AND ADDRESS (at time of iajury) 
BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC. 
PO Box 798 
Lewiston, Idaho 8350 I 
CLAIMANT'S SOCIAL SECURITY NO. CLAIMANT'S BIRTHDATE 
STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED 
State of Idaho, County of Nez Perce 
DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED) 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NA!vlE, ADDRESS, AND TELEPHONE NUMBER 
Michael Kessinger 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Telephone Number: 208. 743.2313 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S 
(NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND 
PO Box83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0044 
DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
September I 6, 2013 
WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WAS EARNING AN AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE 
OF: $ _369.60 , PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 72-419 
Claimant's left foot was ran over by a cart. When returning from a surety mandated medical evaluation for her left foot, Claimant was involved in a head-on collision. Both of Claimant's legs were 
broken. 
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 
Claimant suffered a broken left foot in her initial industrial injury. In the crash returning from the medical evaluation, both of Claimant's legs were broken. 
WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT TIDS TIME? 
See issues below. 
DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO EMPLOYER TO WHOM NOTICE WAS GIVEN 
Se tember 16, 2013 
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN: lliJ ORAL D WRITTEN 0 OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY 
ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED 
1. Entitlement to medical care; 
2. Entitlement to temporary total disability; 
3. Entitlement to permanent partial impairment; 
4. Entitlement to disability in excess of impainnent; 
5. Entitlement to retraining; 
6. Entitlement to attorney fees for an unreasonable denial of benefits. 
DO YOU BELIEVE TIDS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? lliJ YES O NO. IF SO, PL_E;.f\SE STATE WHY. 
Claimant was returning from a surety mandated medical evaluation over I 00 miles from her home when she was involved in a car crash. Claimant was not at fault fQr the crash. It is Claimant's 
position that under the compensable consequences doctrine the surety is responsible for the damages Claimant has incurred as a result of the crash. -- · ' ""; 
NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
IDAHO CODE § 72-334 AND FILED ON FORM I.C. 1002 
ICIOOl ( COMPLETE OTHER SIDE) Complaint - Page 1 of 3 
PHYSICIANS WHO TREATED CLAJMANT (NAME AND. .· 0RESS) 
Tri-State Memorial Hospital; PO Box 189; Clarkston, Washington 99403 
Lewiston Orthopaedic Associates; 320 Warner Drive; Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Sport Physical Therapy; 328 Warner Drive; Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Interventional Pain Consultants; 2841 Juniper Drive; Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Robert Freidman MD; PO Box 1128; Boise, Idaho 83701 
Moscow Ambulance; 603 S Main Street; Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Gritman Medical Center; 700 S Main Street; Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Sacred Heart Medical Center; IO I W 8111 Avenue; Spokane, Washington 9920 I 
Northwest MedStar; PO Box ll005; Spokane Valley, Washington 99211 
Prestige Care; 1014 Burrell Avenue; Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU INCURRED TO DATE? 
To be ascertained 
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY? $ Unknown WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID, IF ANY?$_ Unknown 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. [8] YES 
DATE SIGNATURE CLAJMAJ;JT OR ATTORt"'!EY 
---~1 (11)l1Lf 
I ' ! 
PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW 
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS 
NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER OF PARTY DATE OF DEATH RELATION TO DECEASED CLAIMANT 
FILING COMPLAINT 
WAS FILING PARTY DEPENDENT ON DECEASED? I DID FILING PARTY LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT? DYES ONO DYES DNo 
CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
D NO 
I hereby certify that on the day of January, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Complaint upon: 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. 
PO Box 798 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
via: personal service of process 
x regular U.S. Mail-Certified 
via: 
SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
PO Box83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0044 
personal service of process 
-------------- ------
regular U.S. Mai{-Certified 
NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form J.C. 1003 with 
the Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid 
default. If no answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered! 
Further information may be obtained from: Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0041 (208) 334-6000. 
(COMPLETE MEDICAL RELEASE FORJW ON PAGE 3) 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0041 
Patient Na """'._.,,,~-"-'--r-------
Birth Date: "-L-L""'-'----------
Address: i.=.=--:...<...t:!..J.<O. 
Phone Number: 2D 
SSN or Case Number: "--__ _ 
(Provider Use Only) 
Medical Record Number: ________ _ 
o Pick up Copies o Fax Copies # __ 
o Mail Copies 
ID Confirmed by: 
AUTHORIZATION FOR DISCLOSURE OF HEALTH INFORMATION 
I hereby authorize ____________ to disclose health information as specified: 
Provider Name - must be specific for each provider 
To:-------------------------------------
Insurance Company/Third Party Administrator/ Self Insured Employerl/SIF, their attorneys or patient's attorney 
Street Address 
City State Zip Code 
Purpose or need for data:---=---,--------------------
(E.g. Worker's Compensation Claim) 
Information to be disclosed: 
Discharge Summary 
History & Physical Exam 
Consultation Reports 
Operative Reports 
Lab 
Date(s) of Hospitalization/Care: ______ _ 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Pathology 
Radiology Reports 
Radiology Films 
Entire Record 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D Other: Specify _____________________ _ 
I understand that the disclosure may include information relating to (check if applicable). 
D AIDS or HIV 
D Psychiatric or Mental Health Information 
D Drug/Alcohol Abuse Information 
I understand that the information to be released may include material that is protected by Federal Law (45 CFR Part 164) and 
that the information may be subject to redisclosure by the recipient and no longer be protected by the federal regulations. I 
understand that this authorization may be revoked in writing at any time by notifying the privacy officer, except that revoking 
the authorization won't apply to information already released in response to this authorization. I understand that the provider 
will not condition treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility for benefits on my signing this authorization. Unless otherwise 
revoked, this authorization will expire upon resolution of worker's compensation claim. Provider, its employees, 
officers, copy service contractor, and physicians are hereby released from any legal responsibility or liability for disclosure of 
the above information to the extent indicated and authorized by me on this form and as outlined in the Notice of Privacy. My 
signature below authorizes release of all information specified in this authorization. Any questions that I have regarding 
disclosure may be directed to the privacy officer of the Provider specified above. 
Signature of Legal Representative & Relationship to Patient/Authority to Act Date 
Signature of Witness Date 
Original: Medical Record Copy: Patient Complaint - Page " ' -
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BARBARA KELLY, 
Claimant, 
V. 
BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC 2013-024694 
ORDER ON REQUEST FOR 
EMERGENCY HEARING 
On February 10, 2014, Claimant filed a Request for Emergency Hearing. Pursuant 
to the telephone conference conducted by Referee Michael E. Powers with the parties on 
February 19, 2014, and for good cause shown, 
The Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho hereby ORDERS that in lieu of a 
hearing, the parties have agreed to file a Stipulation of Facts on the issue of whether 
Claimant's automobile accident was a compensable consequence of her workers' 
compensation claim. 
A briefing schedule will be issued once the Stipulation of Facts has been filed with 
the Commission. 
DATED this~ +.h day of February, 2014. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
~~~ 
Michael E. Powers, Referee 
ORDER ON REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY HEARING - 1 
ATTEST: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
+.h-
I hereby certify that on the JO day of February, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
ORDER ON REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY HEARING was served by United States 
Certified Mail upon each of the following: 
MICHAEL T KESSINGER 
PO BOX 287 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
WYNN MOSMAN 
PO BOX 8456 
MOSCOW ID 83843-8456 
ge 
ORDER ON REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY HEARING - 2 
SEND ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL CO SION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. BOX 8372 nlSE, IDAHO 83720-0041 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
1.C. NO. 13-024694 INJURY DATE September 16, 2013 
(xJ The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating: 
0 The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS 
Michael Kessinger 
Barbara Kelly Attorney at Law 
c/o Michael Kessinger PO Box 287 
PO Box 287 Lewiston, ID 83501 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S 
(NOT ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS 
Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. 
PO Box 798 IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND 
Lewiston, ID 83501 PO BOX83720 
BOISE, ID 83720 
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER OR EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (NAME 
ADDRESS) 
WYNN MOSMAN 
MOSMAN LAW OFFICES 
PO BOX 8456 
MOSCOW, ID 83843 
IT IS: (Check One) 
Admitted 
[gf 0 
t8J D 
t8J D 
0 fg] 
0 D 
NIA N/A 
t8J D 
t8J D 
t8J D 
Denied 
AND ADDRESS) 
·.· 
1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually occurred on or 
about the time claimed. 
2. That the employer/employee relationship existed. 
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act. 
4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused 
entirely by an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment. 
5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the 
nature of the employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of 
and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment. 
6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given 
to the employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the 
manifestation of such occupational disease. 
7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to 
Idaho Code, § 72-419: $ . 
8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
9. What benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant? 
None beyond additional care recommended by Dr. Friedman, the IME physician. 
IC1003 (Rev. 1/01/2004) (COMPLETE OTHER SIDE) 
Appendix 3 
Answer-Page 1 of 2 
Continued from front 
10. State with specificity what matters a ", dispute and your reason for denying liability, t <:,[her with any affirmative defenses. 
Entitlement to medical care; temporary total disability; permanent partial impairment; disability in excess of impairment; retraining 
and attorney fees. 
Under the Commission rules, you have 21 days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy of 
your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U.S. mail 
or by personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by law, and 
not cause the claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of a hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and accrued 
should be paid. Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule 3.D., Judicial Rules of Practice 
and Procedure under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
must be filed on Form I.C. 1002. 
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. ~YES 0No 
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW ORA COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE. 
Yes. Defendants deny that injuries resulting from the motor vehicle accident are a compensable consequence of the industrial injury. 
Amount of Compensation Paid to Date Dated tri:J''"' o, AtOOmey PPI/PPD TTD Medical 2 -) 1/-/3/ $0.00 $4,989.21 $9,880.85 
PLEASE COMPLETE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I f 
I hereby certify that on the J.-,f day of February, 2014, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon: 
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS EMPLOYER AND SURETY'S INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND 
Barbara Kelly 
c/o Michael Kessinger 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
via: D personal service of process 
r2J regular U.S. Mail 
NAME AND ADDRESS (if applicable) 
via: D personal service of process 
D regular U.S. Mail 
via: D personal service of process 
D regular U.S. Mail 
Answer-Page 2 of 2 
Mar. 24. 2014 3:40PM Goi echea law Off ices Lewiston No. 8212 P. 2 
Michael T. Kessinger, Esq.~ ISBA No. 6719 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
826 Main Street 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-2313 
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140 
Attorneys for the Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BARBARA KELLY, 
Claimant, 
V. 
BLUE RfBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No.: 13-024694 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
COME NOW the above-entitled parties by and through their respective attorneys 
of record, and in accordance with the Industrial Commission's Order On Request For 
Emergency Hearing, hereby stipulate to the following facts on the issue of whether 
Claimant's automobile accident was a compensable consequence of her workers' 
compensation claim: 
1. On September 16, 2013, Claimant Barbara Kelly (hereafter Claimant) was an 
employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. (hereafter Blue Ribbon), ln Lewiston, 
Idaho, At said time, Blue Ribbon was insured for its obligations under the Idaho 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 1 
Michael T. Kessinger, Esq. - !SBA No. 6719 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
826 Main Street 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-2313 
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140 
Attorneys for the Claimant 
1-1 .( • 
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IC No.: 13-024694 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
COME NOW the above-entitled parties by and through their respective attorneys 
of record, and in accordance with the Industrial Commission's Order On Request For 
Emergency Hearing, hereby stipulate to the following facts on the issue of whether 
Claimant's automobile accident was a compensable consequence of her workers' 
compensation claim: 
1. On September 16, 2013, Claimant Barbara Kelly (hereafter Claimant) was an 
employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. (hereafter Blue Ribbon), in Lewiston, 
Idaho. At said time, Blue Ribbon was insured for its obligations under the Idaho 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 
Workers' Compensation Act by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (hereafter 
Surety). 
2. On or about September 16, 2013, Claimant, Employer, and Surety were subject 
to the provisions of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law. 
3. Claimant suffered a compensable workers' compensation injury when a cart 
rolled over her left foot while in the course and scope of her employment with 
Blue Ribbon on September 16, 2013. 
4. Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the injury to 
her left foot. 
5. On or about November 8, 2013, Julie Estes, an agent of Surety, sent Claimant a 
letter, which read as follows: 
We [Surety] have arranged for you to be seen in an independent medical 
evaluation with Robert Friedman. This appointment is scheduled for 
November 15, 2013, at 1 :00 p.m. and will be held at Kootenai Health 
Plaza, which is located at 1300 East Mullan Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho. 
Please make the necessary arrangements to keep this appointment and 
bring copies of all x-rays/MRI films with you. Failure to do so may 
result in the termination of benefits and the responsibility for any "no 
show" charges. 
You may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office for 
reimbursement. This should include the date traveled, destination, and 
round trip mileage. 
6. It is approximately 125 miles each way from Claimant's workplace in Lewiston, 
Idaho, to Post Falls, Idaho. 
7. Dr. Robert Friedman performs medical evaluations in Lewiston, Idaho. 
Appointments with Dr. Friedman were available in November in Post Falls and in 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 2 
December in Lewiston. Claimant was scheduled for the November appointment 
in Post Falls. 
8. On November 15, 2013, Claimant traveled to Post Falls, Idaho, for the surety-
scheduled medical evaluation. On said date she was still an employee of Blue 
Ribbon and was receiving time loss benefits from Surety. 
9. Directly after meeting with Dr. Friedman, Claimant began her return trip from 
Post Falls, Idaho, to Lewiston. 
10. Claimant did not make any stops or take any detours on her way home from the 
appointment with Dr. Friedman. 
11. At 3:50 p.m. on November 15, 2013, on US 95 approximately five miles south of 
Potlatch, it was snowing, and the road was covered with snow. At said locatior:i, 
Claimant was southbound in her Ford Expedition when a northbound Ford F150 
lost traction, crossed the centerline, and collided head-on with Claimant's vehicle. 
Claimant's actions did not cause or contribute to the collision. 
12. As a result of the automobile collision, Claimant suffered severe physical injuries 
to her lower extremities. Due to the extent of her injuries, Claimant's doctor 
restricted her from any weight-bearing on her lower extremities until further 
notice. As a result of the crash, Claimant was in a skilled nursing facility in 
Lewiston, Idaho, until February 28, 2014. 
2014. 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 3 
MICHAEL KESSINGER 
Attorney for Claimant 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Stipulation of Facts via facsimile and US Mail 
upon: 
Wynn Mosman 
PO Box 8456 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Fax: 208.882.0589 
STIPULATION OF FACTS 5 
Apr. 1/. 1014 2:11PM Goicoechea Law Offices Lewiston 
Michael T. Kessinger, Esq; - ISBA No. 6719 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
826 Main Street 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-2313 
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140 
Attorneys for the Claimant 
No. 8436 P. 2 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BARBARA KELLY, 
Claimant, 
V. 
BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No.: 13-024694 
CLAIMANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
OPENING STATEMENT 
The Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the above-entitled matter to Referee 
Michael E. Powers, In lieu of a hearing, the parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts. 
tSSUE 
Whether the automobile accident of November 15, 2013, was a compensable 
consequence of Claimant's September 16, 2013, workers' compensation injury. 
CLAIMANT'S OPENING BRIEF 1 
Michael T. Kessinger, Esq. - ISBA No. 6719 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
826 Main Street 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-2313 
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140 
Attorneys for the Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BARBARA KELLY, 
Claimant, 
V. 
BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No.: 13-024694 
CLAIMANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
OPENING STATEMENT 
The Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the above-entitled matter to Referee 
Michael E. Powers. In lieu of a hearing, the parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts. 
ISSUE 
Whether the automobile accident of November 15, 2013, was a compensable 
consequence of Claimant's September 16, 2013, workers' compensation injury. 
CLAIMANT'S OPENING BRIEF 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the following facts: 
On September 16, 2013, Claimant Barbara Kelly (hereafter Claimant) was an 
employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc, (hereafter Blue Ribbon), in Lewiston, Idaho. 
At said time, Blue Ribbon was insured for its obligations under the Idaho Workers' 
Compensation Act by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (hereafter Surety). 
On or about September 16, 2013, Claimant, Employer, and Surety were subject 
to the provisions of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Law. 
Claimant suffered a compensable workers' compensation injury when a cart 
rolled over her left foot while in the course and scope of her employment with Blue 
Ribbon on September 16, 2013. 
Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the injury to 
her left foot. 
On or about November 8, 2013, Julie Estes, an agent of Surety, sent Claimant a 
letter, which read as follows: 
We [Surety] have arranged for you to be seen in an independent medical 
evaluation with Robert Friedman. This appointment is scheduled for 
November 15, 2013, at 1:00 p.m. and will be held at Kootenai Health 
Plaza, which is located at 1300 East Mullan Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho. 
Please make the necessary arrangements to keep this appointment and 
bring copies of all x-rays/MRI films with you. Failure to do so may 
result in the termination of benefits and the responsibility for any "no 
show" charges. 
You may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office for 
reimbursement. This should include the date traveled, destination, and 
round trip mileage. 
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It is approximately 125 miles each way from Claimant's workplace in Lewiston, 
Idaho, to Post Falls, Idaho. 
Dr. Robert Friedman performs medical evaluations in Lewiston, Idaho. 
Appointments with Dr. Friedman were available in November in Post Falls and in 
December in Lewiston. Claimant was scheduled for the November appointment in Post 
Falls. 
On November 15, 2013, Claimant traveled to Post Falls, Idaho, for the surety-
scheduled medical evaluation. On said date she was still an employee of Blue Ribbon 
and was receiving time loss benefits from Surety. 
Directly after meeting with Dr. Friedman, Claimant began her return trip from 
Post Falls, Idaho, to Lewiston. 
Claimant did not make any stops or take any detours on her way home from the 
appointment with Dr. Friedman. 
At 3:50 p.m. on November 15, 2013, on US 95 approximately five miles south of 
Potlatch, it was snowing, and the road was covered with snow. At said location, 
Claimant was southbound in her Ford Expedition when a northbound Ford F150 lost 
traction, crossed the centerline, and collided head-on with Claimant's vehicle. 
Claimant's actions did not cause or contribute to the collision. 
As a result of the automobile collision, Claimant suffered severe physical injuries 
to her lower extremities. Due to the extent of her injuries, Claimant's doctor restricted 
her from any weight-bearing on her lower extremities until further notice. As a result of 
the crash, Claimant was in a skilled nursing facility in Lewiston, Idaho, until February 28, 
2014. 
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ARGUMENT 
The provisions of Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the injured worker. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 
955, 956, 793 P.2d 187 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room 
for narrow, technical construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759 
(1996). 
1. The Idaho Industrial Commission has adopted the Compensable 
Consequences Doctrine set forth in Larson's Workers' Compensation Law. 
The Idaho Industrial Commission and the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho have 
often looked to Larson's Workers' Compensation Law when deciding Idaho workers' 
compensation cases. It is well-established that the Idaho Industrial Commission has 
adopted the "compensable consequence" doctrine discussed by Professor Larson, the 
leading authority on workers' compensation in the United States. This doctrine provides: 
When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of 
employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises 
out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause 
contributable to the claimant's own intentional conduct. 
Larson's Workers Compensation Law, ch. 10 (2010). 
In accordance with the compensable consequence doctrine, the Industrial 
Commission has consistently found that secondary injuries are compensable when they 
are a result of a primary compensable injury; for some examples see Lee v. J.R. 
Simplot Co., 1996 IIC 0019 (January 1996) (Upper extremity condition developed during 
employer approved vocational rehabilitation found to be a compensable consequence of 
a work-related back injury); Salvador2003 v. Fremont Compensation, 2003 IIC 0258 
(April 2003) (Right shoulder injury caused by the LifeFit program during treatment for a 
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low back injury held to be a compensable natural consequence of the original back 
injury); Nelson v. First Interstate Bank and Transportation Ins. Co., 2000 IIC 0914 
(October 2000) (Left shoulder injury found to be a compensable consequence of the 
original right shoulder injury). 
Quasi-course of employment and implied employment contract are two legal 
theories that are central to the compensable consequence doctrine as it applies to 
injuries sustained while traveling to and from a medical evaluation. 
a. Quasi-Course of Employment 
At the very foundation of the compensable consequence doctrine is a deviation 
from the standard "course and scope" of employment requirements that generally 
govern the compensability of an industrial injury: 
Since, in the strict sense, none of the consequential injuries we are concerned 
with are in the course of employment, it becomes necessary to contrive a new 
concept, which we may for convenience call "quasi-course of employment." By 
this expression is meant activities undertaken by the employee following upon his 
or her injury which, although they take place outside the time and space limits of 
the employment, and would not be considered employment activities for usual 
purposes, are nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that they are 
necessary or reasonable activities that would not have been undertaken but for 
the compensable injury. 
Larson's, § 10.05 (2010). 
Professor Larson's example of quasi-course activity is on point: 
When the injury following the initial compensable injury arises out of a quasi-
course activity, such as a trip to the doctor's office, the chain of causation should 
not be deemed broken by mere negligence in the performance of the activity, but 
only by intentional conduct which may be regarded as expressly or impliedly 
prohibited by the employer. 
Larson's,§ 10.05 (2010) (emphasis added). 
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The Idaho Industrial Commission has adopted a position very close to quasi-
course activity outlined by Professor Larson. Discussing the compensable consequence 
doctrine, the Commission held: 
The application of this rule is almost entirely limited to situations where a primary 
work-related injury is followed by a later nonwork-related injury. The rule is 
remedial in nature; its purpose, under such circumstances, is to assure the 
worker is compensated for the later, nonwork-related injury by providing that 
such an injury "likewise arises out of employment." 
Keith v. Connors Logging, Inc., 1990 IIC 0660 (September 1990). 
b. Implied Employment Contract 
Many jurisdictions have held the correlative duties imposed on employers and 
injured workers become by implication part of the employment contract. Professor 
Larson, discussing the Kansas case, Taylor v. Centex Constr. Co., 191 Kan. 130, 379 
P.2d 217 (1963), wrote that the arguments put forth by the Kansas Court for 
compensability in this setting "are difficult to answer": 
The court noted that the employer is under a statutory duty to furnish medical 
care, and that the employee is similarly under a duty to submit to reasonable 
medical treatment under the act. The provisions of the act, in turn, become by 
implication part of the employment contract. This being so, the better view 
appears to be that accidental injuries during a trip made pursuant to this statutory 
and contractual obligation are work connected. 
Larson's,§ 10.07 (2010). 
California reached similar conclusions in Laines v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 
48 Cal.App.3d 872 (1975), and Durham Transportation Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals 
Bd., 68 Cal.Comp.Cases 469 (2003). The California Court of Appeals and the Workers' 
Compensation Appeals Board both held that injuries sustained in a motor vehicle 
collision while traveling to or from a medical facility necessitated by a compensable 
industrial injury are compensable consequences of the industrial injury. In arriving at its 
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conclusion, the Court reasoned the Code was to be liberally construed with the purpose 
of extending benefits and that the injured worker was required to submit to examination 
and treatment as a condition of receiving compensation. 
Similar to Kansas and California, I.C. § 72-433 allows employers to require 
claimant's submission to a medical examination: "employee, if requested by the 
employer ... , shall submit himself for examination at reasonable times and places to a 
duly qualified physician or surgeon." The employer is responsible to pay for the medical 
evaluation and the injured worker's travel expenses. A correlative duty is imposed on 
the injured worker: she must attend the medical evaluation scheduled by the employer. 
In the case before the Commission, if Claimant did not attend the medical examination 
scheduled by Surety, she ran the risk of having her benefits terminated. Ongoing 
approval of her workers' compensation benefits were contingent on her traveling to 
Defendants' chosen doctor at a time and place beyond Claimant's control. 
2. Claimant's automobile accident was a compensable consequence of her 
workers' compensation claim. 
The parties agree that Claimant suffered a compensable workers' compensation 
injury on September 16, 2013, to her foot. The parties also agree that, pursuant to I .C. § 
72-433, Defendant Surety scheduled Claimant for an independent medical evaluation 
as a result of her September 16, 2013, injury. The Surety-mandated examination 
required Claimant to drive from Lewiston to Post Falls. But for the original injury on 
September 16, Claimant would not have been at the scene of the crash on November 
15, 2013. 
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The Commission has routinely inserted the facts of a specific case into Professor 
Larson's definition of the compensable consequence doctrine. In this case, it would read 
as follows: 
When the primary injury [Claimant's foot injury of September 16, 2013] is shown 
to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural 
consequence that flows from the injury [the medical evaluation and ensuing car 
accident] likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an 
independent intervening cause contributable to the claimant's own intentional 
conduct. 
Claimant's own intentional conduct did not contribute to the crash. 
Claimant's injuries sustained in the car accident fall squarely within the purview of 
the compensable consequence doctrine. Claimant was involved in a quasi-course 
activity as she traveled home from the surety-mandated medical evaluation. Claimant's 
travel on November 15, 2013, to and from Post Falls would not have been undertaken 
but for her compensable injury of September 16, 2013. Defendant Surety's and 
Claimant's duties under Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act became by implication part 
of the employment contract. Thus, the car accident is a compensable natural 
consequence flowing from the primary injury. 
3. Kiger is distinguishable from the case presently before the Commission 
and is inconsistent with the current state of Idaho's workers' compensation 
law. 
In 1963 the Idaho Supreme Court decided the case of Kiger v. The Idaho Corp. 
and Employers Fire Ins. Co., 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963). In Kiger the claimant 
was traveling to a routine doctor's appointment for a compensable workers' 
compensation injury when she was involved a car accident. Limiting its analysis to 
injuries sustained while in the strict "course of employment", the Court found that 
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injuries sustained in the automobile accident were not compensable under the workers' 
compensation claim. 
Unlike the case presently before the Commission, the claimant in Kiger had set 
her own doctor's appointment. She decided when and where she would receive her 
medical care. What is more, there is no indication in Kiger that the employer/surety was 
compensating claimant for her travel. Whereas, in the present case, Surety, not 
Claimant, controlled where and when Claimant had to travel. Surety told Claimant to 
attend the medical examination 125 miles from home and that "failure to do so may 
result in the termination of benefits." Furthermore, Defendants advised Claimant: "You 
may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office for reimbursement." 
What is more, Kiger was decided in 1963, prior to the comprehensive revision of 
Idaho's workers' compensation laws in 1971, and prior to Idaho's adoption of the 
compensable consequence doctrine. The Idaho Industrial Commission has utilized the 
compensable consequence doctrine since at least 1990 to find claims compensable. 
Keith v. Connors Logging, Inc., 1990 IIC 0660 (September 1990). Since 1990, the 
Industrial Commission has consistently ruled that claims are compensable under the 
compensable consequence doctrine. By its very definition, the compensable 
consequence doctrine makes injuries that are not incurred in the strict "course of 
employment" compensable. Keith, 1990. 
In addition to the Industrial Commission decisions already set forth above, there 
are many other compensable consequence cases that are inconsistent with the strict 
"course of employment" interpretation set forth in Kiger: Offer v. Clearwater Forest 
Industries, 2000 IIC 0956 (October 2000) (Left shoulder injury that developed while 
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compensable right shoulder injury was healing was found to be a compensable 
consequence of the right shoulder injury); Quentin2003 v. American Interstate Ins. Co., 
2003 IIC 0237 (April 2003) (Left leg DVT, which developed weeks after the 
compensable injury, and low back symptoms found to be compensable consequences 
of limp caused by the compensable right knee injury); Castaneda v. Idaho Home Health, 
Inc., 1999 IIC 0857 (July 1999) (finding a compensable closed fracture of the humeral 
neck in the right shoulder prevented claimant from using her shoulder in a normal 
fashion during recovery, which resulted in a compensable right elbow injury); and 
Benner v. Home Depot, Inc., 2013 IIC 0020 (January 2013) (finding a panic attack and 
psychiatric hospitalization in 2007 were compensable consequences of 2005 back 
injuries). 
The facts in Kiger are clearly distinguishable from the case presently before the 
Commission. Moreover, the law as applied in Kiger is inconsistent with the current state 
of Idaho's workers' compensation law. Claimant's injuries from the motor vehicle 
collision are a compensable consequence of her September 16, 2013, industrial injury. 
4. There is persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to support the 
compensability of injuries sustained while traveling to or from medical 
appointments required or authorized by the employer/surety. 
Professor Larson reports that accidents during trips to the doctor's office are 
generally compensable: 
§ 10.07 Accident During Trip to Doctor's Office 
When an employee suffers additional injuries because of an accident in the 
course of a journey to a doctor's office occasioned by a compensable injury, the 
additional injuries are generally held compensable ... 
Larson, 2010. 
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The following is a sampling of jurisdictions that have decided cases consistent with 
Professor Larson's observation. 
In Fenton v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 87 Or.App. 78, 741 P.2d 517, review 
denied, 304 Or. 311, 744 P32d 1295 (1987), the Oregon Court of Appeals concluded 
that, "when a worker is injured in an accident which occurs during a trip to see a 
physician for treatment of a compensable injury, the new injury is also compensable." 
In Iris Vandorn, BIIA Dec., 02 11466 (2003), the Washington Board of Industrial 
Insurance Appeals found that the injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision on a 
return trip from a vocational appointment, made at the direction of the Department of 
Labor and Industries, were compensable. The Board cited Larson's Workers 
Compensation Law with respect to travel to and from medical appointments in allowing 
the injuries sustained in the collision as a compensable consequence of the previously 
compensable injury. 
In addition to the states that have already been addressed, the following 
jurisdictions have held that injured workers who are injured traveling to or from medical 
examinations or treatment required by or authorized by the surety/employer are covered 
by workers' compensation under the previously compensable injury: Arizona in Joplin v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 175 Ariz 524, 858 P.2d 669 (Ariz.App. Div. 1 1993); Colorado in 
Excel Corp. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 860 P.2d 1393 (Colo.App. 1993); 
Nebraska in Straub v. City of Scottsbluff, 280 Neb. 163, 784 N.W.2d 886 (201 O); 
Georgia in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Crawford, 177 Ga. App. 242, 339 S.E.2d 
292 (1985); Minnesota in Pedersen v. Maple Island Inc., 256 Minn. 21, 97 N.W.2d 285 
(1959); Mississippi in Charles N. Clark Associates, Ltd. v. Dependents of Robinson, 357 
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So.2d 924 (1978, Miss); New Jersey in Camp v. Lockheed Electronics, Inc., 178 N.J. 
Super. 535,429 A.2d 615, cert. den. 87 N.J. 415, 434 A.2d 1090 (1981); New York in 
Consolazio v. Merchants Mutual Ins., 709 N.Y.S.D.2d 191 (A.O. 2 Dept. 2000); 
Maryland in Harris v. Mackin & Associates, 100 Md.App. 363, 641 A.2d 938 (Md.App. 
1994); Pennsylvania in Berra v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Terminix Intern. 
Inc.), 165 Pa.Cmwlth. 298, 645 A.2d 342 (1994); and Virginia in lmmer & Co. v. 
Brosnahan, 207 Va. 720, 152 S.E.2d 254 (1967). 
Consistent with the general consensus of jurisdictions and with Idaho's prior 
adoption of the compensable consequence doctrine, Claimant's motor vehicle collision 
was a compensable consequence of her September 16, 2013, work injury. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Surety chose the doctor and exercised control of the time and place of 
the medical evaluation in Post Falls. Short of jeopardizing her workers' compensation 
benefits, Claimant had no choice but to attend the appointment 125 miles from her 
home. 
The Industrial Commission must decide between requiring the Employer/Surety 
to bear the risk of a Claimant's injury while traveling or requiring the Claimant to bear 
the risk of any mishap that may befall her while complying with statutorily required 
attendance at a medical examination. 
The compensable consequence doctrine has been adopted by the Idaho 
Industrial Commission. Consistent with the doctrine, the risk of injury during travel to 
and from surety-mandated medical evaluations should be borne by the employer/surety. 
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Wherefore, Claimant requests that the Commission find that the injuries she 
sustained in the motor vehicle collision of November 15, 2013, were a compensable 
consequence of her September 16, 2013, work injury. 
DATED this l r~day of April 2014. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
Michael Kessinger 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / 7t1I_ day of April 2014 I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of Claimant's Opening Brief via facsimile and US Mail upon: 
Wynn Mosman 
PO Box 8456 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Fax: 208.882.0589 
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V. 
BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC, 
Employer, 
And 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants.· 
IC No: 13-024694 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF 
BACKGROUND 
Relevant facts are undisputed and are before the Commission by Stipulation. In 
short, Claimant was struck head-on while returning from.a medica[ evaluation. Claimant 
was injured in the collision, and required medical care. This is solely dispute over the 
law, not the relevant facts. 
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ISSUE 
Whether Claimant is entitled to medical benefits for injuries suffered in an 
automobile accident while returning from an independent medical evaluation. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Under controlling Idaho precedent, the motor vehicle accident was 
"an intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause" 
and therefore the proximate cause of those injuries 
When presented with similar facts, the Supreme Court of Idaho denied benefits. 
In Kigerv. The Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424,380 P2d 208 (1963) the claimant was 
injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving to be seen by her treating doctor. The 
claimant sought benefits for injuries resulting from the accident, and was denied 
benefits by the Idaho Accident Board. The claimant appealed. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that those injuries did not arise 
out of and in the course of the claimant's employment. Quoting from an earlier Court 
opinion, the Court stated " ... if there occurs, after the initial accident and injury, an 
intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause, the latter occurrence 
becomes the proximate cause." Id. at 430 (quoting Under v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho 
656). 
It appears that the Supreme Court in Kigerwas presented with similar arguments 
as are presented here by claimant- "The Compensation Act should be given a broad, 
liberal construction, doubtful cases result in favor of compensation and the main 
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purpose which the act seeks to serve leaves no room for technical construction." Kiger 
at 426. Also see Claimant's Opening Brief, p. 4. 
Those arguments correctly state the law. Nonetheless, the law of Idaho remains 
that when there is an intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause, 
benefits must be denied. 
2. Persuasive Authority 
Courts of other jurisdictions, following the reasoning of Kiger and Linder, have 
denied compensation under similar facts. For example, in Wyoming Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P2d 372 (Wyo. 1997), the injured employee 
was killed in a car accident while returning from a medical appointment when her 
vehicle slid on ice and rolled. As is the case here, the employee: 
• had previously suffered an undisputed workplace injury; 
• was awarded benefits for that injury, including medical benefits; 
• was returning from a medical appointment in connection with treatment and care 
required for the workplace injury; 
• had been required to travel some distance (out of state) to seek required care, 
and was paid for the travel; 
• was injured while proceeding directly home from her appointment, without 
evidence of diverting on an errand or any other activity unrelated to her 
appointment; 
• was not driving negligently at the time of the accident. 
Id. at 374, 375 
The Hearing Examiner found that the death was compensable because the death 
could be linked to the injury. Id. at 377. 
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming found that the " ... linkage between 
the compensable injury and the travel is direct and unbroken." Id. at 375. The Court was 
presented with the question of the whether the heirs of the employee were entitled to 
benefits under a Wyoming statute which mandated death benefits "if an injured 
employee dies as a result of a work related injury ... [.]" Id. 
The Court found that the death statute at issue provided broader protections than 
other workplace injuries not resulting death. The Court wrote " ... the language 'as a 
result of' is broader than the concept of 'proximate cause[.]' The Legislature chose this 
language for a reason, and that reason must be because death benefits were not 
intended to be restricted only to families of those whose deaths were immediately, 
solely, primarily, or proximately caused by industrial accidents." Id. at 376. 
Even with broader protections, the court reversed the hearing examiner, finding 
that in order for death to be compensable, the initial injury must be the direct cause of 
the employee's death. Id. at 377. The court's reasoning is particularly instructive here, 
and therefore will be quoted at length: 
As the division points out, it would be impossible to ever cut off 
compensability if we were to adopt the hearing examiner's interpretation of 
the causation requirement. Would we compensate an employee who 
wrecked her car and died because she fell asleep at the wheel while she 
was on her way to see her doctor? Would we compensate an employee 
who was killed by a drunk driver while she was on her way home from her 
doctor's appointment? A logical end would not exist to the causation test 
which the hearing examiner proposes. Furthermore, it would lead to too 
many abuses, and the worker's compensation fund would, in effect, 
become a general health and accident insurance fund, a purpose for 
which it was not intended. 
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A causal connection does not exist between the employee's initial injury 
and her car accident. The fact that she was returning from a doctor's 
appointment for an injury which she sustained while she was 
working ... does not translate to a finding that the injury caused her death. 
Certainly, the accident which caused the employee's death did not occur 
because of her work related back injury. The accident was not a hazard of 
her employment that she would not have been subjected to apart from her 
job nor did it result from a risk reasonably incident to the character of the 
business. Rather, the accident resulted from a hazard that we are all 
equally exposed to - bad road conditions. 
Id. at 377-378 
(emphasis added) 
Likewise, in Carlson v. Young, 171 NE2d 736 (Ohio 1959), the employee was 
required to submit to a medical examination, and while in route was injured in a bus 
accident. In affirming the lower court's denial of benefits due to injuries caused by the 
bus accident, the Court of Appeals of Ohio stated: 
If the intervening cause was wholly responsible for the final result, then no 
liability attaches to the previous injury. To create liability, the disability 
suffered must be the consequence of a continuous chain of causation so 
connected that the act or force complained of is carried through from the 
employment to the accident to the injury and to the disability. If an 
intervening independent agency breaks the chain of causation so as to 
destroy the original force, the employer is relieved from injuries following 
· the termination of the force which the employment set in motion. 
Id. at 738-739 
(quoting from Scheider on Workmen's Compensation, v. 6, § 1543(f), p. 
53) 
(Also see Rucker v. Michigan Smelting & Refining Co., 300 Mich. 668, 2 NW2d 
808 (1942); and Dean v. Chrysler Corp., 434 Mich. 655, 455 NW2d 699 (1990). 
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CONCLUSION 
Claimant's motor vehicle collision was an intervening, independent, responsible, 
and culminating cause and therefore the proximate cause of the injuries resulting from 
the collision. Therefore, claimant must be denied benefits associated with those injuries. 
I 
day of May, 2014.) / 
fVt/tv~ 
WYN/JMOS~N 
DATED this 
I I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of May, 2014, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served upon the following individual by regular US mail:. 
Michael Kessinger 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF - 6 (@ 
MOSMAN 
LAW OFFICES 
Michael T. Kessinger, Esq. - ISBA No. 6719 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
826 Main Street 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 7 43-2313 
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140 
Attorneys for the Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BARBARA KELLY, 
Claimant, 
V. 
BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
IC No.: 13-024694 
CLAIMANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
1. Defendants ignore the Compensable Consequence Doctrine. 
The Idaho Industrial Commission has consistently applied the compensable 
consequence doctrine to workers' compensation claims for approximately 25 years. 
Despite the well-established precedent, and despite the direct application of the 
doctrine, as set forth by Professor Larson, to the facts at issue in this case, Defendants 
do not address the doctrine in their brief. The doctrine dictates that Claimant's injuries 
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sustained in the motor vehicle collision are a compensable consequence of her primary 
industrial injury. 
2. The minority view put forth by Defendants is not persuasive. 
As set forth in Claimant's Opening Brief, an overwhelming majority of states that 
have addressed the issue currently before the Commission have concluded that injuries 
sustained in a motor vehicle collision while traveling to or from a medical appointment 
necessitated by a compensable industrial injury are a compensable consequence of the 
primary industrial injury. Defendants argue that the Commission should adopt the 
minority position. Defendants cite cases from two other jurisdictions to support their 
contention that Claimant's injuries from the subject collision are not compensable. 
First, Defendants cite the Wyoming case of Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 372 (Wyo.1997). Unlike Idaho, Wyoming has 
not adopted the compensable consequence doctrine. Instead, Wyoming has adopted 
the "second compensable injury rule", which applies "when an initial compensable injury 
ripens into a condition requiring additional medical intervention." Yenne-Tulley v. 
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 170, 172 (Wyo. 2000). Thus, Bruhn is neither 
persuasive nor instructive in the case before the Commission. 
In addition to the Wyoming case, Defendants cite an Ohio Court of Appeals 
decision from 1959 and Michigan decisions form 1942 and 1990. Like Wyoming, and 
unlike Idaho, it appears that neither Michigan nor Ohio have adopted the compensable 
consequence doctrine as defined by Professor Larson. 
The authority provided by Defendants from other jurisdictions is unpersuasive. 
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GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
Michael Kessinger 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the d,;{':?- day of May 2014 I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of Claimant's Reply Brief via facsimile and US Mail upon: 
Wynn Mosman 
PO Box 8456 
Moscow, ID 83843 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BARBARA KELLY, 
Claimant, 
V. 
BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
Defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
IC 2013-024694 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSION OF LAW, 
ORDERAND 
DISSENTING OPINION 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the 
above-entitled matter to Referee Michael Powers. In lieu of a hearing, the parties submitted the 
issue for resolution on a Stipulation of Facts and briefing. Michael Kessinger of Lewiston 
represented Claimant, and Wynn Mosman of Moscow represented Defendants. The matter came 
under advisement on May 29, 2014. The undersigned Commissioners have chosen not to adopt 
the Referee's recommendation and hereby issue their own findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and order. 
ISSUE 
The sole issue to be decided is whether Claimant is entitled to applicable workers' 
compensation benefits for injuries suffered in an automobile accident while returning from an 
IME scheduled by Surety related to Claimant's ongoing workers' compensation claim. 
SYNOPSIS OF CASE AND CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
On September 16, 2013, Claimant suffered a covered industrial accident while working 
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for Employer. Pursuant to the ensuing workers' compensation claim, Surety ordered Claimant to 
attend an IME in Post Falls, Idaho on November 15, 2013. On her return trip home to Lewiston 
from the IME, Claimant was involved in an automobile accident, which resulted in further 
mJunes. 
The parties dispute whether Claimant's injuries sustained in the auto accident would be 
subject to workers' compensation benefits. Claimant argues under the theory of "compensable 
consequences" the injuries would be covered. Defendants argue the accident was an 
"intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause" and therefore not subject to 
workers' compensation coverage. 
RECORD FOR REVIEW 
The record in this matter consists of the Stipulation of Facts and legal briefing submitted 
by the parties. 
STIPULATED FACTS 
The undisputed and stipulated facts are set forth below verbatim from the parties' 
Stipulation of Facts. 
I. On September 16, 2013, Claimant Barbara Kelly (hereafter Claimant) was an 
employee of Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc. (hereafter Blue Ribbon), in Lewiston, Idaho. At 
said time, Blue Ribbon was insured for its obligations under the Idaho Workers' Compensation 
Act by the Idaho State Insurance Fund (hereafter Surety). 
2. On or about September 16, 2013, Claimant, Employer, and Surety were subject to 
the provisions ofidaho's Worker's Compensation Law. 
3. Claimant suffered a compensable workers' compensation injury when a cart rolled 
over her left foot while in the course and scope of her employment with Blue Ribbon on 
September 16, 2013. 
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4. Surety paid medical and time loss benefits to Claimant as a result of the injury to 
her left foot. 
5. On or about November 8, 2013, Julie Estes, an agent of Surety, sent Claimant 
a letter, which read as follows: 
We [Surety] have arranged for you to be seen in an independent 
medical evaluation with Robert Friedman. This appointment is scheduled for 
November 15, 2013, at 1:00 p.m. and will be held at Kootenai Health Plaza, 
which is located at 1300 East Mullan Avenue, Post Falls, Idaho. 
Please make the necessary arrangements to keep this appointment and bring 
copies of all x-rays/MRI films with you. Failure to do so may result in the 
termination of benefits and the responsibility for any "no show" charges. 
You may submit a report of all travel expenses to this office for reimbursement. 
This should include the date traveled, destination, and round trip mileage. 
6. It is approximately 125 miles each way from Claimant's workplace in Lewiston, 
Idaho, to Post Falls, Idaho. 
7. Dr. Robert Friedman performs medical evaluations in Lewiston, Idaho. 
Appointments with Dr. Friedman were available in November in Post Falls and in December in 
Lewiston. Claimant was scheduled for the November appointment in Post Falls. 
8. On November 15, 2013, Claimant traveled to Post Falls, Idaho, for the surety-
scheduled medical evaluation. On said date she was still an employee of Blue Ribbon and was 
receiving time loss benefits from Surety. 
9. Directly after meeting with Dr. Friedman, Claimant began her return trip from 
Post Falls, Idaho, to Lewiston. 
10. Claimant did not make any stops or take any detours on her way home from the 
appointment with Dr. Friedman. 
11. At 3:50 p.m. on November 15, 2013, on US 95 approximately five miles south of 
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Potlatch, it was snowing and the road was covered with snow. At said location, Claimant was 
southbound in her Ford Expedition when a northbound Ford F150 lost traction, crossed the 
centerline, and collided head-on with Claimant's vehicle. Claimant's actions did not cause or 
contribute to the collision. 
12. As a result of the automobile collision, Claimant suffered severe physical injuries 
to her lower extremities. Due to the extent of her injuries, Claimant's doctor restricted her from 
any weight-bearing on her lower extremities until further notice. As a result of the crash, 
Claimant was in a skilled nursing facility in Lewiston, Idaho, until February 28, 2014. 
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS 
13. The provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793 
P.2d 187, 188 (1990). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical 
construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). 
14. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-102(18)(a) a claimant must prove not only that she 
was injured, but also that the injury was caused by an accident "arising out of and in the course 
of' her employment. In Idaho, the seminal case treating what it is an injured worker must prove 
in this regard is Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 235 P.2d 736 (1951). Although the 
Idaho rule did not originate in Eriksen, the rule is given its most lucid expression in that case. 
Quoting from the Oregon case of Larsen v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 135 Or. 137, 
295 P. 195 (1931 ), the Eriksen court explained what it means for an accident to arise out of and 
occur in the course of employment: 
It is sufficient to say that an injury is received 'in the course of the employment 
when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to 
perform. It arises 'out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational 
mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between 
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting 
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mJury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural 
incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person 
familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the 
nature of the employment, then it arises 'out o:f the employment. But it excludes 
an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing 
proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would 
have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger 
must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be 
incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of 
master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the 
event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the 
employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence. 
Eriksen v. Nez Perce County, 72 Idaho at 6 (1951). This explanation has been cited with 
approval in almost every subsequent Idaho case in which "arising" and "course" issues are 
discussed. See Colson v. Steele, 73 Idaho 348, 252 P.2d 1049 (1953); Kiger v. Idaho 
Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963); Wilder v. Redd, 111 Idaho 141, 721 P.2d 1240 
(1986); O'Loughlin v. Circle A Construction, 112 Idaho 1048, 739 P.2d 347 (1987); Evans v. 
Hara's, Inc., 123 Idaho 473, 849 P.2d 934 (1993); Kessler on behalf of Kessler v. Payette 
County, 129 Idaho 855, 934 P.2d 28 (1997); Dinius v. Loving Care and More, Inc., 133 Idaho 
572, 990 P.2d 738 (1999); Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 18 P.3d 211 (2000). 
However, that portion of the Eriksen rule which excludes from coverage injuries caused by 
exposure to a risk to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from 
employment has been implicitly, if not explicitly, ovenuled by Spivey v. Novartis Seed, Inc., 137 
Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002), and Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 155 Idaho 903, 318 
P.3d 893 (2014). In Spivey, the claimant suffered a shoulder injury as the result ofreaching over 
a conveyor belt to remove a small pebble. Defendants urged the Court to apply the rule 
explained in Eriksen, and so conclude that Spivey could not prevail where it was shown that her 
employment subjected her to the same risk of injury to which she was exposed apart from her 
employment. Defendants argued that in order to prevail Spivey must demonstrate that her 
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employment exposed her to a risk of injury that was greater than the risk to which she was 
exposed apart from her employment. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that Idaho 
law no longer supports the proposition that a claimant must demonstrate that her employment 
subjects her to a "greater risk" of injury before she can recover benefits. After Spivey, supra, it 
seems clear that where the risk of injury is one to which the claimant is equally exposed both 
within and without the workplace, this will not be an impediment to compensability, as might be 
suggested by the Eriksen rule. However, Spivey does nothing to denigrate the long followed rule 
that for an injury to be compensable a sufficiently strong causal connection must exist between 
the employment and the injury that a reasonable person would conclude that employer should 
bear responsibility for the injury. 
15. The question presented by the facts before us is whether the injuries Claimant 
suffered as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident of November 15, 2013, can be said to 
arise out of, and occur in the course of her employment. The only connection between 
Claimant's employment and the injuries in question is the fact that Claimant was returning home 
following an Idaho Code§ 72-433 medical exam at the time the motor vehicle accident occurred. 
Idaho Code§ 72-433 provides in pertinent part: 
After an injury or contraction of an occupational disease and during the period of 
disability the employee, if requested by the employer or ordered by the 
commission, shall submit himself for examination at reasonable times and places 
to a duly qualified physician or surgeon. The employee shall be reimbursed for 
his expenses of necessary travel and subsistence in submitting himself for any 
such examination and for loss of wages, if any. For purposes of this section, the 
reimbursement for loss of wages shall be at the employee's then current rate of 
pay if the employee is then working; otherwise, such reimbursement shall be at 
the total temporary disability rate. Reimbursement for travel expenses, if the 
employee utilizes a private vehicle, shall be at the mileage rate allowed by the 
state board of examiners for state employees; provided, however, that the 
employee shall not be reimbursed for the first fifteen (15) miles of any round trip, 
nor for traveling any round trip distance of fifteen (15) miles or less. Such 
distance shall be calculated by the shortest practical route of travel. 
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Therefore, if requested by the employer, the injured worker shall submit to such examination. 
16. An injured worker who fails to comply with the employer's request for a medical 
examination faces curtailment of benefits and suspension of workers' compensation proceedings 
as specified by Idaho Code§ 72-434. That section provides: 
If an injured employee unreasonably fails to submit to or in any way obstructs an 
examination by a physician or surgeon designated by the commission or the 
employer, the injured employee's right to take or prosecute any proceedings under 
this law shall be suspended until such failure or obstruction ceases, and no 
compensation shall be payable for the period during which such failure or 
obstruction continues. 
17. The injuries for which Claimant seeks benefits are not those directly caused by 
the admittedly compensable accident of September 16, 2013. Rather, the injuries for which 
Claim~nt seeks benefits are, at most, a remote consequence of the original work injury. Claimant 
contends, however, that because she was required by statute to attend the Idaho Code § 72-433 
exam, the injuries she sustained as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident are a 
compensable, albeit remote, consequence of the original work injury. 
18. As the parties have discovered, there is an Idaho case very nearly on point to the 
instant matter, Kiger v. The Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963). Before 
discussing Kiger, however, it is helpful to review several of the cases cited in Kiger, and upon 
which the Kiger court relied in reaching its decision. 
19. In Farmers' Gin Co. et al. v. Cooper et al., 147 Okl. 29,294 P. 108 (1930), the 
claimant suffered an injury to his eye while working on a cotton gin. A little less than a month 
later, claimant was returning from receiving medical treatment for his eye injury when he was 
involved in a motor vehicle accident as a result of which he sustained a fractured patella. The 
Oklahoma Industrial Commission determined that claimant's eye injury was one arising out of 
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and in the course of his employment and that the patellar injury, too, was compensable, because 
it resulted from the eye injury. Applying a rule defining what it means for an injury to both arise 
out of and be in the course of employment very similar to the Eriksen rule, the Farmers' Gin 
Company Court rejected the notion that the knee injury could be said to be an injury arising out 
of and in the course of employment. In so doing, the Court recognized that claimant's invitation 
to find the knee injury compensable was, at its heart, an invitation to adopt a "but for" test of 
causation: 
Did the last accident arise "out of' the employment? We hold it did not, for it 
was not the result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, 
but, on the other hand, it was the result of a condition common to the 
neighborhood - an ordinary automobile accident. It may just as well have been a 
bolt of lightening. It was not incidental to the character of the business in which 
claimant was employed. The highway collision was the proximate cause of the 
accident; it was an intervening cause. Southern Surety Co. v. Galloway, 89 Okl. 
45, 213 P. 850. Consequently we can and do say, without hesitation, that the last 
injury did not arise out of the employment. The latter injury is no more the result 
of the former accident than it was the result of claimant's having been born. It is 
equally clear that but for either event claimant would not have been where he was 
when last stuck, but such is not the test. The decisive fact is that the latter 
accident was in no sense due to the employment, nor did it result from a risk 
reasonably incident to the employment and there is a severance rather than a 
causal connection between the conditions under which the work was required to 
be performed and the resulting injury. 
Farmers' Gin Co. et al. v. Cooper et al., 292 P. at 110 (1930). 
20. In Linder v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho 656, 135 P.2d 440 (1943) Decedent suffered 
an original work-related injury to his left arm in March of 1941. As a result of this injury, he 
was placed in a plaster cast extending from the shoulder to the fingers, holding the elbow rigid 
and the forearm at a right angle to the upper arm. While being so treated, Decedent and a 
companion went fishing from a small boat at Sage Hen Reservoir. In the course of their outing, 
the boat capsized and Decedent drowned. Decedent's survivors contended that they were 
entitled to death benefits on the theory that the original accident was the proximate cause of 
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Decedent's death because the cast on Decedent's arm hindered him in his ability to swim or 
otherwise save himself after being thrown into the water. As to Claimant's speculation in this 
regard, the Court noted that there was no proof on the exact cause of Decedent's death. 
21. On the question of whether or not the boating accident constituted an intervening 
cause breaking the chain of causation between the original work accident and Decedent's death, 
the Court stated: 
We accept as correct appellant's proposition of law that the definition and 
determination of "proximate cause" in the field of torts is applicable herein. A 
recognized concomitant is that if there occurs, after the initial accident and injury, 
an intervening, independent, responsible, and culminating cause, the latter 
occurrence becomes the proximate cause. 
'The proximate cause of an event must be understood to be that which in a natural 
and continuous sequence, unbroken by a new cause, produces that event and 
without which that event would not have occurred.' [Emphasis added.] (Pilmer 
v. Boise Traction Co., Ltd., 14 Ida. 327, at 341, 94 P. 432.) 
The law regards the one as the proximate cause of the other, without regard to the 
lapse of time where no other cause intervenes or comes between the negligence 
[initial injury] charged and the injuries received to contribute to it. There must be 
nothing to break the causal connection between the alleged negligence [first 
accident and injury] and the injuries [death].' [Emphasis added.] (Antler v. Cox, 
27 Ida. 517, at 527, 149 P. 731.) 
It must be clearly kept in mind that the essential causal connection which must not 
be broken is, not that between the concededly compensable accident and the 
direct injury therefrom (Brink v. H Earl Clack Co., 60 Ida.730, 96 P.(2d) 500), 
but between the initial accident and injury and a subsequent and otherwise 
disconnected injury having no relationship whatever to decedent's employment. 
Linder v. City of Payette, 64 Idaho at 658-59 (1943). 
The Court concluded that the facts of the case were sufficient to support the conclusion of the 
Industrial Accident Board that the boating accident constituted an intervening cause which broke 
the causal connection between the original work accident and Decedent's death. 
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22. In Kiger v. The Idaho Corp., supra, the claimant was injured on September 16, 
1960 when she slipped and fell at her place of employment while carrying flats of eggs. Kiger 
suffered injuries to her right lower back as a result of the accident. Following the accident she 
began to treat with Dr. Hawkins. On October 10, 1960, while driving to Dr. Hawkins' office for 
treatment, Claimant was involved in an automobile accident which caused severe neck and 
shoulder injuries. The Industrial Accident Board found that the injuries claimant sustained as the 
result of the automobile accident did not arise out of and in the course of claimant's employment 
and were therefore not compensable, notwithstanding the fact that the injury would not have 
occurred if claimant had not been seeking treatment for the injuries associated with the original 
accident. 
23. On appeal, the Court stated that in order to determine whether or not the injuries 
caused by the automobile accident are compensable, it must be determined whether that injury 
was one arising out of and in the course of claimant's employment. In discussing the "arising" 
and "course" requirements, the Court quoted extensively from the Eriksen rule discussed above. 
The Court noted that the only connection between claimant's employment and the injuries she 
received as a result of the motor vehicle accident was the fact that she was on her way to receive 
treatment for her admittedly work-related low back injury at the time the motor vehicle accident 
occurred. Citing the reasoning of the court in Farmers' Gin Co. v. Cooper, with approval, the 
Linder court ruled that the motor vehicle accident at issue was not due to claimant's 
employment, and did not result from a risk reasonably incident to her employment. Rather, the 
motor vehicle accident constituted an intervening cause which broke the chain of causation 
between the original work accident and the injuries claimant received as a result of the motor 
vehicle accident. Thus, even though the motor vehicle accident would not have occurred "but 
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for" the fact that claimant originally suffered a slip and fall injury at work, employer cannot be 
held responsible for the consequences of the motor vehicle accident because legal or proximate 
cause cannot be established. 
24. We believe that Kiger is controlling, and the automobile accident in this case, as 
with the automobile accident at issue in Kiger, constitutes an intervening cause breaking the 
chain of causation between Claimant's employment and the motor vehicle accident. Of course, it 
is not lost on us that the facts of this case are slightly different than those before the court in 
Kiger. In Kiger claimant was on her way to receiving medical treatment at the time of the motor 
vehicle accident, whereas Ms. Kelly was on her way home after attending a surety-required 
Idaho Code§ 72-433 exam. Had she refused to attend this exam, or had she otherwise frustrated 
the purposes of surety to obtain such an exam, she could have faced curtailment of workers 
compensation benefits and the suspension of proceedings before the Commission. It is argued 
that these facts warrant a different result than that which obtained in Kiger. However, we fail to 
see why this distinction should result in a different outcome, tempting though it may be. After 
all, rather than arrange an Idaho Code § 72-433 exam at a time and place more convenient to 
Claimant, surety arranged for an exam far removed from Claimant's residence, at a time of year 
that would expose her to dangerous conditions while traveling. While Claimant could have 
petitioned the Industrial Commission for relief from the scheduled exam, and therefore cannot 
be said to have been without recourse, she failed, for whatever reason, to pursue this, and so 
suffered the injuries that she assuredly would not have suffered "but for" the Idaho Code 
§ 72-433 exam. In this case, as in Kiger, a causal connection does exist between the original 
work-related injury and the motor vehicle accident because the motor vehicle accident would not 
have happened but for the original work-related injury. However, like Kiger, Claimant's injuries 
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were caused by the actions of a negligent third party which severed that causal connection, even 
if one accepts the proposition that the causal connection was stronger under the facts of this case. 
The intervening cause is the true proximate cause of Claimant's injuries, not her employment or 
the subject accident. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW AND ORDER 
1. Claimant is not entitled to Workers' Compensation benefits for the injuries that 
she suffered as the result of the November 15, 2013 motor vehicle accident. 
2. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all 
matters adjudicated. 
Dated this~'--day of~~~~~----' 2014. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ATTEST: 
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COMMISSIONER R.D. MAYNARD DISSENTING: 
After reviewing the record and controlling Idaho case law on the matter, I respectfully 
dissent from the analysis and conclusions of the majority. 
The majority begins its analysis by acknowledging Idaho precedent regarding whether an 
injury caused by an accident arose out of and in the course of employment, citing Ericksen v. Nez 
Perce County, 72 Idaho 1, 235 P.2d 736 (1951). The majority then discusses Spivey v. Novartis 
Seed Inc., 137 Idaho 29, 43 P.3d 788 (2002) and goes a step further by "concluding that Idaho 
law no longer supports the proposition that a claimant must demonstrate that her employment 
subjects her to a 'greater risk' of injury before she can recover benefits." Majority Decision 
,r 14. 
The majority concedes a connection between Claimant's employment and the injuries in 
question because Claimant was returning home following a mandatory medical exam, pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 72-433, at the time the motor vehicle accident (MVA) occurred. My colleagues 
further concede that an injured worker who fails to comply with an employer's request for an 
independent medical exam (IME) risks curtailment of benefits and suspension of workers' 
compensation proceedings. Idaho Code § 72-434. The law requires, and the stipulated facts 
reflect, that Claimant would be reimbursed for her travel expenses. Idaho Code § 72-433(1) also 
requires reimbursement for any loss of wages incurred while submitting to an IME. Having cited 
Idaho law and undisputed facts that would support compensation of Claimant's MVA injuries, 
the majority then goes outside Idaho law in an attempt to justify its denial of benefits. 
After reviewing what it considers to be compelling case law, the majority ultimately 
returns to an Idaho case that it characterizes as "very nearly on point to the instant matter." 
Majority Decision ,r 18; Kiger v. Idaho Corporation, 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963). In 
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comparing the facts of Kiger with the facts of this case, the majority grapples with "whether 
there is a distinction [between Kiger's non-compensable subsequent accident and Claimant's 
subsequent accident] that will bear close scrutiny." Majority Decision 1 34. The majority finds 
in the negative. My colleagues note that the Kiger Court "quoted extensively from the Ericksen 
rule." Majority Decision ~ 23. The citation by the Kiger Court to the Ericksen decision is as 
follows: 
It is sufficient to say that an injury is received 'in the course of the employment 
when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to 
perform. It arises 'out of the employment, when there is apparent to the rational 
mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between 
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting 
injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural 
incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person 
familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the 
nature of the employment, then it arises 'out of the employment. But it excludes 
an injury which cannot be fairly traced to the employment as a contributing 
proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would 
have been equally exposed apart from the employment. 
Kiger, 85 Idaho at 430, 380 P.2d at 210-211. It is puzzling, at best, to understand how the 
majority could rely on a 51-year-old case that quotes extensively from a portion of another case 
that the majority admits "has been implicitly, if not explicitly, overruled" recently by Spivey in 
2002. Majority Decision 1 14. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the findings in Kiger are still good law, there is an 
obvious distinction between a required IME and an appointment for treatment of a compensable 
injury. Kiger was injured while traveling to a routine medical appointment made necessary as a 
result of her work-related injury. Claimant was injured while traveling home from an 
employer-compelled IME. An IME is not medical care provided as a result of a work-related 
injury; an IME is an exam conducted for Employer/Surety's benefit to assess a claimant's 
condition. As previously stated, a claimant must submit to an employers request for an IME or 
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risk having her workers' compensation benefits terminated. Idaho Code § 72-433 requires that 
the claimant be reimbursed for any expenses, including loss of wages, incurred as a result of 
submitting to the IME. It defies logic, then, to find that a compulsory directive given by an 
Employer/Surety for which the employee receives reimbursement for expenses, including wages, 
is outside the course and scope of the employee's scope of employment. Idaho case law is clear 
that "[ c ]ompensation is allowable when the injury arises out of the nature of the employment, 
conditions, obligations, or incidents of the employment." Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 
22, 28, 170 P.2d 404,408 (1946) (emphasis added). 
The majority characterizes Claimant's MVA as a "remote consequence of the original 
work injury." Majority Decision ,r 17. Attending an IME may not have been within Claimant's 
original job description when she was hired by Employer, but Claimant's directive to attend 
upon threat of losing her benefits certainly creates a sufficient nexus to find a requisite causal 
connection between Claimant's original compensable injury and her subsequent MVA. Whether 
it is the employer's directive or the employment itself that causes a claimant's injury, the injury 
necessarily arises out of and in the course of employment. 
Claimant, in the discharge of a duty owed to her Employer/Surety, attended a mandatory 
IME - not a medical appointment for treatment of her injuries. Pursuant to Idaho Code, she was 
entitled to financial reimbursement for travel expenses incurred by attending the exam. The 
stipulated facts reflect that Claimant did not stop or make any detours while attending the 
scheduled IME. Further, Claimant's actions did not cause nor contribute to the collision that 
caused her later injuries. There is no other reasonable conclusion but that Claimant's injuries 
were directly and proximately caused by the circumstances that arose out of and in the course of 
her employment. 
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For the foregoing reasons, I submit this dissent. 
Dated this __ £_(i,~t_h ___ day of :....:::..c_ _ _,2014. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ATTEST: 
Assistant Cotim}:i,1 
- 1r • 
- . 
- . ~ .. 
"'.'-,, J\., ••••••••••• 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the £,f.ttS-. day of ~~'.1_ __ ___, 2014, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FAC , CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
ORDER AND DISSENTING OPINION was served by regular United States Mail upon each 
of the following: 
MICHAEL T KESSINGER 
POBOX287 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
WYNN MOSMAN 
PO BOX 8456 
MOSCOW ID 83843-8456 
ka 
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Michael T. Kessinger, ISB# 6719 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
826 Main Street 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208) 743-2313 
Facsimile: (208) 743-8140 
Attorneys for the Claimant/ Appellant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BARBARA KELLY, 
IC No.: 2013-024694 
Claimant/ Appellant, 
V. NOTICE OF APPEAL 
BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer/Respondent, 
and 
IDAHO STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety /Respondent. 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., and 
Idaho State Insurance Fund, by and through their attorney ofrecord, Wynn 
Mosman, PO Box 8456, Moscow, Idaho, AND THE CLERK OF THE ST ATE 
OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Barbara Kelly, appeals against the above-named 
Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusion of Law, Order and Dissenting Opinion entered in the above-entitled proceeding on 
September 26, 2014, Chairman Thomas P. Baskin presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 1 
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order described 
above is an appealable order pursuant to Rule 11 ( d) I.A.R. 
3. The issue on appeal is whether the Industrial Commission erred in concluding that 
Appellant was not entitled to applicable workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered in 
an automobile collision while returning from a Respondent-mandated medical examination 
related to Appellant's workers' compensation claim. 
4. There is no hearing transcript in the above-entitled matter, as the parties stipulated to the 
facts of the case. 
5. The Appellant requests that the following documents be included in the agency's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 I.A.R.: 
a. All briefs filed by the parties; and 
b. The Parties' Stipulation of Facts. 
6. The undersigned certifies that: 
a. The Industrial Commission has been paid the estimated fee of $100.00 for 
preparation of the agency record, pending computation of the actual fee; 
b. The appellate filing fee of $94.00 is being paid herewith; and 
c. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 
I.A.R. 
DATEDthis 2 
~--
NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES, LLP 
Michael Kessinger 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served on the following parties via 
US Mail: 
Wynn Mosman 
PO Box 8456 
Moscow, ID 83843 
FAX: 208.882.0589 
Michael Kessinger 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 3 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BARBARA KELLY, 
Claimant/ Appellant, 
V. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer, and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, Surety, 
Defendants/Respondents 
Appeal From: 
Case Number: 
Order Appealed from: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Attorney for Respondents: 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: · 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Name of Reporter: 
Industrial Commission, 
Thomas P. Baskin, Chairman presiding 
IC 2013-024694 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and 
Dissenting Opinion, filed September 26, 2014. 
Michael T. Kessinger 
PO Box 287 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Wynn Mosman 
PO Box 8456 
Moscow, ID 83843-8456 
Claimant/ Appellant, Barbara Kelly 
Defendants/Respondents, Blue Ribbon Linen 
Supply, Inc. and Idaho State Insurance Fund 
October 30, 2014 
$94.00 to Supreme Court and 
$100.00 to Industrial Commission 
Checks were received. 
No hearing was held. 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR BARBARA KELLY - 1 
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Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
No hearing was held. The decision was based upon 
a stipulation of facts. 
October 30, 2014 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR BARBARA KELLY - 2 
CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL 
I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct 
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and 
Dissenting Opinion, and the whole thereof, in IC case number 2013-024694 for Barbara Kelly 
vs. Blue Ribbon Linen Supply, Inc., Employer, and Idaho State Insurance Fund, Surety. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of 
said Commission this 30th day of October, 2014. 
CERTIFICATION OF APPEAL-Barbara Kelly-1 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all 
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court 
No. 42658 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b ). 
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly 
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon settlement 
of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein. 
DATEDthisj(c{ day of a~ , 2014. 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD (BARBARA KELLY - 42658) - 1 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BARBARA KELLY, 
Claimant/ Appellant, 
V. 
BLUE RIBBON LINEN SUPPLY, INC., 
Employer, and IDAHO STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, Surety, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 42658 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; and 
Michael T. Kessinger for the Appellants; and 
Wynn Mosman for the Respondent. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and, 
pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
MICHAEL T KESSINGER 
POBOX287 
LEWISTON ID 83501 
Attorney for Respondent(s): 
WYNN MOSMAN 
PO BOX 8456 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the 
Clerk's Record, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION (BARBARA KELLY - 42658) - 1 
objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the twenty-eight day 
period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho, this ~_day of_Jj_~~~!'__ __ , 2014. 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
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